The hearing will come to order.

We’re here today to discuss recent troubling developments in the

Korean Peninsula and the road ahead in dealing with the Democratic

People’s Republic of Korea.

We’re going to hear first from the administration’s point man on

North Korea and my friend and constituent, Ambassador Stephen

Bosworth, the Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

at Tufts University.

We’ll also hear an expert panel of witnesses who together have

more than 100 years of experience dealing with the challenges that

we face in North Korea.

North Korea’s test of a long-range ballistic missile last April, followed

by its second nuclear test last month, are, frankly, reckless

and irresponsible acts that do nothing to advance North Korea’s

security.

I was pleased to see that last night in New York the Permanent

Five Members of the U.N. Security Council agreed to speak with

one voice and tell North Korea that its conduct is unacceptable.

The Draft Security Council resolution which we expect to be voted

on soon imposes a sweeping new arms embargo on North Korea

and also bans financial transactions linked to North Korea’s

nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

Significantly, it calls upon Member States to inspect all cargo to

and from North Korea on the high seas, at seaports, and at airports

if countries have reason to believe the cargo contains material

related to North Korea’s nuclear program or other weapons

programs.

The Obama administration should be commended for this strong

united outcome and China deserves recognition, as well.

As North Korea’s ally and largest trading partner, China can

play a decisive role in the peaceful resolution of this crisis. I was

in China when North Korea conducted its second nuclear test and

I am convinced, based on the meetings I had and the language

used as well as the body language interpreted, that China shares

our opposition to the North’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

We can all be forgiven for feeling that we’ve been here before. As

one knowledgeable observer wrote to me recently, we are now ‘‘hip

deep into the third North Korean nuclear crisis.’’

The first crisis ended in 1994 with the signing of the agreed

framework which froze the North’s production of plutonium for 8

years. In 2002, the Bush administration confronted North Korea

with allegations that it was cheating on the framework, but the

Bush administration ruled out direct talks to resolve the issue. The

result was the second nuclear crisis: the demise of the agreed

framework itself, North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty and the quadrupling of North Korea’s stockpile

of fissile material.

So today, we confront a more dangerous North Korea that says

it is determined to bolster its nuclear deterrent in defiance of its

neighbors and other members of the international community.

How we deal with North Korea this time around will have grave

implications not just for maintaining peace and stability in Northeast

Asia, for our alliances with South Korea and Japan, but it will

particularly have an impact on our ongoing nonproliferation efforts

with respect to Iran and any other would-be nuclear power.

Step 1 is to get a unified response from the United Nations. That

result appears to be eminent. But then we must resist the temptation

to go into a defensive crouch. The past teaches us that benign

neglect is not a viable option. America must lead efforts to stop the

current negative cycle of action and reaction and begin the hard

diplomatic work needed to deliver results.

As we seek to engage, we should remember the counsel of former

Secretary of Defense William Perry who advised us to deal with

North Korea ‘‘as it is, not as we would wish it to be. We should

not assume that North Korea sees the world the way we do.’’

Recent developments should convince us to test our assumptions

about North Korea and its motives. For instance, when I was in

China discussing this with Chinese leaders, it was clear that there

are a number of reasons for North Korea’s current actions. One

begs the question, Is North Korea really just trying to get our

attention in a fairly sophomoric but nevertheless extraordinarily

dangerous way?

The fact is they already had our attention. From day one, the

Obama administration made a point of offering to engage directly

and given the events of the past 6 months, it seems equally possible

that North Korea is simply consumed with its internal leadership

succession issues or possibly even simply responding to its dislike

of the policies of South Korea in the recent period and that has

encouraged it to adopt a brash and defiant posture against external

pressure.

The greatest likelihood—I suspect that Ambassador Bosworth

would agree—is that there’s some of all of these involved in the

position that they’re taking.

Some observers on the outside have concluded that diplomacy

with North Korea is essentially hopeless. Well, I completely and

bluntly disagree with that, as I’m confident Ambassador Bosworth

does. It’s an imperfect tool, but the fact is that even with North

Korea, when we engaged in diplomacy, diplomacy paid some dividends

and it could again in the future.

So finally, there’s a common assumption that North Korea will

sell anything to anyone. North Korea’s export of nuclear technology

to Syria appears to prove that case, but I believe, and I think many

share this and the President included, that it’s worth testing

whether a combination of multilateral enforcement initiatives, such

as the Proliferation Security Initiative, combined with cooperative

threat reduction efforts championed by Senator Lugar, that those

could alter the North’s conduct.

As we test our assumptions, and it’s important that we do, and

examine our options, we have to consider not only who’s at the

table but also whether to attempt to reinvigorate the six-party

talks, launch bilateral negotiations, or devise a new architecture.

We also have to consider how to prioritize the many issues that

demand attention, including nuclear proliferation, human rights,

regional peace and security, economic development, and humanitarian

concerns.

I personally believe that we can get back to the six-party talks,

that we should get back to them, and I believe we will get back to

them. I also believe that bilateral is an important route to simultaneously

take and I have said so for any number of years.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on each of these

questions. Let me just say one quick word before passing it to Senator

Lugar.

I know I speak for every single member of this committee and

for every American when we express how deeply concerned we are

on a purely humanitarian basis, the basis of common sense and decency,

how deeply concerned we are for the fate of two American

journalists, Laura Ling and Euna Lee, who are under detention in

North Korea.

We are offended by the severity and excess of the sentence which

was pronounced on them and we hope that common sense is going

to prevail and that North Korea will see this not as an opportunity

to further dig a hole but as an opportunity to open up and reach

out to the world, to suggest there is a better way to try to deal with

all of these issues.

We urge North Korea to do what is right and we urge them to

do it promptly and unconditionally and to release those young

women from custody.

Thank you, Senator Lugar. Those are, as always,

thoughtful and important questions you asked and I’m confident

that we’ll get the answers to them in the course of the afternoon.

Let me just say that we do have two panels today and we’ll try

to get everybody through here in an appropriate manner.

Victor Cha is the former Director of Asian Affairs at the National

Security Council and he’s a professor at Georgetown University.

Evans Revere is the president of the Korea Society and former

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the East Asia and Pacific

Affairs. Leon Sigal is a professor at the Social Science Research

Council in New York and author of ‘‘Disarming Strangers’’ which

is a diplomatic history of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and Nancy

Lindborg is president of Mercy Corps and has worked inside North

Korea to help deliver food aid to women and children in many

parts; the poorest parts of the country.

So we’re greatly appreciative for their expertise and for being

here, and I’d just introduce Ambassador Bosworth. As many people

know, he’s one of our most distinguished veterans of diplomacy in

the United States, served in many different posts.

I had the pleasure and Senator Lugar did, also, way back in—

now way back in 1986, I worked very closely with Ambassador

Bosworth and Senator Lugar was then chair and worked very

closely with him on the Philippines and we had many meetings and

many visits to the Philippines as we transitioned to the democracy

with Cory Aquino from the Marcos regime and it was really an

astounding transition and I will say again, as I have said previously

in public, that we were lucky, fortuitous, to have an ambassador

of his skill on the ground helping to move complicated issues

as effectively as he did.

It was an enormous privilege to work with him in that period

and I was greatly impressed then and I think we have been ever

since. So we’re delighted you’re back on the job. This is a region

you know well and you’re the right person for this job.

Thank you for being with us.

I see we have a vote that has started. What I

think we’ll do, Senator, if you’re willing, I’ll ask—if you run over

and vote, you’ll probably get back here in time and that way we

cannot interrupt the proceedings. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, you used some appropriately strong language

and I want to see if we can flesh this out a little bit. You talked

about the consequences. You talked about the challenge to order.

You talked about how this must be addressed. You talked about

how these are provocative steps, several times using the word ‘‘provocative’’

steps. You said they must reverse their actions and our

policy is a verifiable denuclearization.

I think you’ve been very clear about how we react to this, what

our goal is, but I want to try to understand a little better what the

range of consequences might be.

I mean, what is coming together—maybe you could even share

with us some framework of these discussions in New York and give

the committee and those listening a sense of what we’re anticipating.

And if they don’t?

What restraints are there at this point on the

diplomatic route being pursued? Has there been a rebuffle—a rebuff

of that? Is there a lack of communication in response or is

there some indication of this opening in the near term?

What if this particular round of sanctions elicits

even further provocative response?

Have the Chinese—I know from my conversations

when I was there that they’ve been in touch, but has there

been any visit or any kind of high-level personal diplomacy in this

effort at this time?

Would you concur that the Chinese response

with respect to this particular test was both quicker and more intense

and palpable than it has been in the past?

Would you further characterize the Chinese concern

in any way that might help us understand the options as we

go forward?

Have there been conversations similarly—obviously

there have been in terms of the resolution, but in terms of

various other potential options and attitudes with respect to

Russia?

Is it fair to say that the P5 is probably more

focused and energized and united on this than it has been in the

past?

What would it take—is there some precondition

under—that is not public—I’m not asking you to make it public,

but is there any precondition with respect to how the United States

gets back to the table or if North Korea came back tomorrow and

said you want to have six-party talks, fine. Would we be there?

Would they start?

And would it be bilateral and multilateral that

we would do that?

In the past, those talks were, I believe, unifocused

on the nuclear issue.

Would there be a willingness this time to be more diverse with

respect to the topics that might be discussed? Would it be all topics

open?

And in my opening comments, I observed the

sort of multiplicity and motives with respect to Kim Jong-il’s

choices here. I wonder if you might comment on your perceptions

as a veteran of this.

Well, I appreciate that. Senator Wicker, did you

already vote?

Let’s find out how much time there is on the

vote——

And we’ll see how slowly I’ll walk.

We’ll try to figure that out. I’ve certainly gone over my time. So I’m

happy to—we only have 2 minutes on the vote. I’m happy to—as

you know, there’s always a little——

I’m delighted. So if you would turn it over to

Senator Lugar when he gets here and I’ll go vote and come back

and we’ll just try to keep going.

And I’ll tell him you’re on your way.

Are you going to vote against him? No.

We’re saved by Senator Wicker.

You can’t steal him. He still lives with us.

Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

Senator Corker, welcome. I know he’s already indicated to me

he’s not going to ask questions.

So we thank you, Ambassador Bosworth, very, very much, wish

you well in the days ahead. We want to stay in close touch and I

know we will. I look forward to chatting with you for a moment.

If we could ask the second panel to quickly come

up and take their seats, so we can have a seamless transition,

that’d be terrific.

I would ask each of the following panelists if they would try to

summarize the comments in 5 minutes or less. Your full statements

will be placed into the record as if read in full and this way

the committee will have more chance to be able to explore the previous

panelist with you and your own thoughts.

We’re going to lead off with Victor Cha and then Mr. Revere,

Leon Sigal, and then Nancy Lindborg.

So, Victor, if you’d begin, that’d be terrific.

Thank you all very much.

So, Mr. Sigal, when Kim Jong-il gets his debrief on what the

Americans are saying about him today and they report that, well,

you know, this guy named Sigal went before the Foreign Relations

Committee and said all they have to do is get some leverage on him

and then, you know, make him dependent, wouldn’t they sort of

have gamed that out? Isn’t that maybe one of the reasons why

they’re very content just to remain isolated and not be dependent

and if they went the opposite way, wouldn’t they have offered it a

little while back?

Then why do you think he’s gone about it the

way he has?

So would—any of you can respond to this question.

Is there any danger at all that in—just going back to the table

and pursuing this route which I think you have to do it because

I don’t think you have many choices, but what is the danger level

with respect to the reward of bad behavior argument?

The flip side of that question, Mr. Cha, is—sort

of goes to your proposal with respect to redesignating them as a

terrorist country.

First of all, are there not specific legal standards that apply to

that designation and do not these steps he’s taken actually fall outside

of them, but equally importantly, wouldn’t that designation at

this moment in time potentially just escalate the latter tit for tat

and perhaps undermine the ability to get to the table where you

need to do the constructive work of diplomacy, i.e., premature?

If it applies.

Thank you very much.

We need to wrap up in a couple minutes. Just one quick question.

The proliferation threat is the threat to the United States of

America right now, barring some missile development that we’re

not aware of, but even then, strategically, fundamentally, the proliferation

issue is the challenge to us.

China, however, Russia, South Korea, and Japan have far more

immediate and, frankly, pressing strategic concerns.

Why can they not summon a stronger response, given their surrounding

clout and already-existing leverage, particularly China?

Well, let me—did you have a comment?

Well, I don’t think we’re going to put our relationship

in jeopardy over it. I don’t think we’re going to need to.

You know, it’s interesting in diplomacy and

international relations, sometimes the biggest of opportunities are

staring you in the face when things look the bleakest.

I do not agree that just because of all this saber rattling and

internal succession game going on and so forth, I’m not—frankly,

I’m concerned about the proliferation issue, but I’m not concerned

that there is an impasse that we can’t get over or there isn’t a way

to get back here.

I believe ultimately, I think there are mistakes that have been

made on our side of the fence over the last few years, too, and they

don’t get heralded enough, but, you know, there were some promises

made about certain things being delivered and they were never

delivered. There were misinterpretations about communication.

The post-9/11 atmosphere altered, the axis of evil and other

kinds of things, you know, Iraq had perceptions of a regime change

in other countries. A lot of attitudes shifted and people responded

to those things, and personally I believe that if we behave as confidently

as we ought to, given the superiority of a number of strategic

fronts on which we’re sitting here, not to mention the presence

of Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea, and South Korea

and China alone are enormously strong and we will remain committed

to Japan’s and South Korea’s strength, we got a lot of—you

know, we’ve got a lot of cards to play here and so I’m really quite

confident that if we play them adeptly and intelligently, I think

North Korea’s longer term interests with respect to a security

arrangement, treaty, not an armistice from 1953 but an understanding

of where we go and an economic future, I think there are

ways to get through this.

And so I think the key here is to get back to the table and not

do things that make it harder to get there rather than easier.

So that’s just a quick summary take. I think your views have

been helpful, important. I think it’s good to air this and we have

a distinguished visitor coming in about 5 minutes and so we’ve got

to get over to the Capitol to meet him, and I apologize.

I will leave the record open for a week for colleagues who’d like

to submit any questions and we will certainly, if you want to articulate

any further in answer to what I just said or anything any

other Senator said, we will invite that because we’d like to have

as complete a record as possible. We may just follow up with you

to that effect.

So thank you very much. I think it’s been very helpful.